The noncooperative Nash equilibrium solution of classical games corresponds to a rational expectations attitude on the part of the players. However, in many cases, games played by human players have outcomes very different from Nash equilibria.
rational expectations attitude of what has been called the Homo oeconomicus, a notion which is at the basis of many theoretical economics constructs. It is therefore important to check the applicability of such notion in human societies. Experiments have been carried out and the problem is that in many cases, when played by human players, games have outcomes very different from the Nash equilibrium points. An interesting case is the ultimatum game [1] . A simplified version of this game is the following:
One of the players (the proposer ) receives 100 coins which he is told to divide into two non-zero parts, one for himself and the other for the other player (the responder ). If the responder accepts the split, it is implemented. If the responder refuses, nothing is given to the players. Consider, for example, a simple payoff matrix corresponding to two different proposer offers
with a ≫ c, a + c = 2b (for example a = 99, c = 1, b = 50). For future reference the players moves are labelled |·· . It is clear that the unique Nash equilibrium is |00 , corresponding to the greedy proposal (a, c). However, when the game is played with human players, such greedy proposals are most often refused, even in one-shot games where the responder has no material or strategic advantage in refusing the offer. Based on this and similar results in other situations (public goods games, etc), Bowles and Gintis [2] [3] developed the notion of strong reciprocity (Homo reciprocans [4] ) as a better model for human behavior. Homo reciprocans would come to social situations with a propensity to cooperate and share but would respond to selfish behavior on the part of others by retaliating , even at a cost to himself and even when he could not expect any future personal gains from such actions.
Going a step further, the same authors in collaboration with a group of anthropologists conducted a very interesting "ultimatum game experiment" in many small-scale societies around the world [5] . Consistently different results are obtained in different societies and the authors conclude that Homo oeconomicus is rejected in all cases, the players' behavior being strongly correlated with existing social norms and market structure in their societies.
Apparently human decision problems involve a mixture of self-interest and a background of (internalized) social norms.
But how does one code for social norms in mathematical games? It is here that quantum games (or a restricted version thereof) may be of help. In a full quantum game [6] the players have at their disposal an Hilbert space of strategies rather than a discrete set (or a simplex in the case of mixed strategies). In practical terms one considers an initial vector in the tensor product space of moves and then each player can act on his part of the space by arbitrary unitary operations. In a restricted quantum game (RQG) version [7] , the initial state is again an arbitrary vector but the players operations are restricted to classical moves, that is, to permutations of their basis states.
The restricted version is probably the most appropriate for human decision problems, because it is not clear how to interpret general unitary operations in terms of human decisions. On the other hand the choice of the initial state might be a useful tool to code for the background of social norms on which classical human moves take place.
For the simplified ultimatum example corresponding to the payoff matrix (1) the Hilbert space is spanned by {|00 , |01 , |10 , |11 }, a general initial state is φ = c 00 |00 + c 01 |01 + c 10 |10 + c 11 |11
with |c 00 | 2 +|c 01 | 2 +|c 10 | 2 +|c 11 | 2 = 1 and the (classical) players moves are the matrices M 0 = 1 0 0 1 and M 1 = 1 0 0 1 or probabilistic combinations thereof for mixed strategies. If the initial φ state is a factorized one, the outcome is the same as in the classical game but not if it is an entangled state. It is easy to interpret this effect. It means that when some action is taken (for example a purely selfish action) in one of the components of the entangled state that will affect the other components as well and the resulting payoff. Individual decisions have entangled consequences and the entanglement is defined by the social environment norms, which in mathematical terms corresponds to the choice of the φ state.
With the general initial state in (2) the game becomes equivalent to a three-parameter family of classical games with payoffs
3) Each member of the family must have at least a Nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies. Let (µ, 1 − µ) and (ν, 1 − ν) be the probabilities for proposer and responder to use moves M 0 and M 1 . Then, their payoffs are, respectively
From (3) one sees that the game is invariant for the replacements (c 11 ↔ c 01 , c 10 ↔ c 00 ) or (c 11 ↔ c 10 , c 01 ↔ c 00 ) and has two different classes of Nash equilibria.
(i) If |c 11 | 2 − |c 01 | 2 and |c 10 | 2 − |c 00 | 2 are both ≥ 0 or ≤ 0 , because of the symmetry one may choose |c 11 | 2 ≥ |c 01 | 2 and |c 10 | 2 ≥ |c 00 | 2 . Then, a Nash equilibrium is obtained for µ = 1 and also for a pure responder strategy ν = 1 or 0 depending on the sign of νc |c 11 | 2 − |c 10 | 2 + νb |c 01 | 2 − |c 00 | 2 .
The payoff of the responder is the largest of c |c 11 | 2 +b |c 01 | 2 or c |c 10 | 2 +b |c 00 | 2 with corresponding proposer payoffs a |c 11 | 2 + b |c 01 | 2 or a |c 10 | 2 + b |c 00 | 2 . An example in this class is
for which the Nash equilibrium payoffs are
(ii) If |c 11 | 2 −|c 01 | 2 and |c 10 | 2 −|c 00 | 2 have opposite signs, choosing |c 11 | 2 ≥ |c 01 | 2 and |c 10 | 2 ≤ |c 00 | 2 the strategy of the proposer now depends on ν and Nash equilibria are obtained for pure or mixed strategies depending on the values of the coefficients. An example is
which has a Nash equilibrium for the mixed strategy µ = ν = 1 2
and payoffs
A even wider range of possibilities and payoff structures may be simply obtained by increasing the number of possible proposer moves in the original payoff matrix.
In conclusion: One sees that the restricted quantum game (RQG) structure, while keeping the rational self-interest choice characteristic of the Nash equilibria, does so in a background that allows for the coding of social norms. This occurs because of the entangled nature of the φ state.
As shown, a RQG is equivalent to a family of classical games. Therefore one might code social norms (as well as player contracts) directly on the family of classical games without any reference to quantum games. Nevertheless the coding of non-trivial members of the family by a simple choice of an entangled φ vector seems to be an useful compact way to characterize such families.
